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The depth of the Great Recession, the slow recovery of job creation, the downward
trend in labor force participation, high long-term unemployment, stagnant or declining
wages for low-to-medium skill jobs owing to adverse labor demand shifts, and a
greater rebound in low-wage than mid- or higher-wage jobs raised concerns that the
normal business cycle dynamics of recovery from the recession will be insufficient to
offset the diminished labor market prospects of many workers. These concerns have
spurred serious consideration of policies to encourage job creation and higher income
from work beyond the more immediate countercyclical policies that were adopted in
response to the Great Recession. Among the policies generating continuing or
renewed interest are hiring credits, higher (sometimes much higher) minimum wages,
and a more substantial earned income tax credit (EITC) for childless individuals. This
paper discusses these policy options, what we know about their likely effects and
trade-offs, and what the unanswered questions are; the focus is on US evidence.
JEL codes: J2, J3, J6
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The depth of the Great Recession, the slow recovery of job creation,1 the downward
trend in labor force participation (Bengali et al., 2013), high long-term unemployment
(Kroft et al., 2014), stagnant or declining wages for low-to-medium skill jobs owing to
adverse labor demand shifts (Autor, 2011), and a greater rebound in low-wage than
mid- or higher-wage jobs (National Employment Law Project, 2012) raised concerns
that the normal business cycle dynamics of recovery from the recession will be insuffi-
cient to offset the diminished labor market prospects of many workers. These concerns
have spurred serious consideration of policies to encourage job creation and higher in-
come from work beyond the more immediate countercyclical policies that were
adopted in response to the Great Recession. Among the policies generating continuing
or renewed interest are hiring credits, higher (sometimes much higher) minimum
wages, and a more substantial earned income tax credit (EITC) for childless
individuals.
This paper discusses these policy options, what we know about their likely effects
and trade-offs, and what the unanswered questions are; the focus is on US evidence,2016 Neumark. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
ndicate if changes were made.
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to review the vast earlier literature on these policies, but rather, the focus is on recent
evidence and—when appropriate—what we can learn from policies adopted during or
after the Great Recession. When possible, it references earlier surveys of the larger
body of evidence. The focus on the most recent evidence on policies to encourage job
creation and higher incomes is informative both because it provides new discussion
and analysis of emerging research on recently tried policies and because changes in
labor markets and the policy environment can lead to longer-standing labor market
policies having different effects now than in past decades.2
The research the survey covers is limited to the effects of the policies considered on
the targeted groups and does not consider the general equilibrium effects of the taxes
or other costs that would or do fund these policies and that could affect other groups
or aggregate activity. For example, higher taxes to finance a more generous EITC might
reduce labor supply of some (presumably higher-income) groups. Nor does it consider
the effects of potential changes in the mix of who works on overall labor productivity.
Such an analysis would be much more stylized and model-based, although it could
potentially yield useful insights. However, abstracting from aggregate effects, the
empirical work undergirding this survey tends to focus on strongly affected groups
relative to others (e.g., single mothers, in the case of the EITC), and it seems likely that
the kinds of effects the literature detects reflect mainly the direct effects of the policy,
rather than the effects of the taxation that finances the policy. And when estimates are
based on comparisons across states in how policies impact affected groups, the esti-
mates should reflect general equilibrium effects (although we may still miss effects on
groups not directly affected). That is, while the targeted group or partial equilibrium
focus no doubt misses some aggregate effects, it seems unlikely to do much to bias esti-
mated effects of policies on the affected groups.2 Job creation strategies
Economic theory predicts that employment can be increased by either subsidizing em-
ployers (with a hiring tax credit or a wage subsidy) or employees (through an EITC or
another worker subsidy). Both types of policies have been used in the USA, at both the
federal and state levels. These sometimes have an explicit distributional goal, but in this
section, I focus on job creation.2.1 Hiring credits
Although hiring credits should spur labor demand by lowering labor costs for em-
ployers, earlier research generally reaches negative conclusions about their effects,
echoed in standard labor economics textbooks (e.g., Borjas, 2010, and Ehrenberg and
Smith, 2009). However, most of the earlier evidence is based on credits targeting spe-
cific groups—often the disadvantaged.
When hiring credits target the disadvantaged, “stigmatization” of those eligible for
the credits can reduce their impact. In particular, eligibility of workers for targeted
hiring credits can provide information to employers that they have been unsuccessful
in the labor market, which can lead employers to regard eligible workers as risky or as
less productive, offsetting the potential impact of the hiring credit (Dickert-Conlin and
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hiring credits stigmatizes the intended beneficiaries, dissipating the effects of the
credits. A striking example is an experimental program for welfare recipients in
Dayton, Ohio, under the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) (Burtless, 1985). One group
received vouchers that they could present to employers for direct cash rebate subsidies,
a second group received vouchers that let employers claim hiring credits under one of
two existing programs, and a third group was eligible for the same credits, but neither
received vouchers to give to employers nor were they told that they were eligible. The
third group had the most success in finding employment. Given that assignment to
groups was random, so that the only difference was the information given to employers
and workers, it is plausible to interpret the worse outcomes for those with vouchers as
indicating adverse stigma effects that reduced the effect of the hiring credits.
In the context of battling the aftereffects of severe economic downturns like the
Great Recession, however, this perspective may be inappropriate. Compared with hiring
credits targeting the disadvantaged, more explicit counter-recessionary hiring credits
could be more effective. And although the official end date of the Great Recession is
now well behind us, and labor markets are recovering, there are continuing problems
of long durations of unemployment,3 and research points to specific difficulties of the
long-term unemployed in finding new jobs (Kroft et al., 2013). A broader hiring credit
focused on the unemployed or those who have been out of the labor force may avoid
the problem of stigma, because with high unemployment rates and low participation
rates, eligibility for a hiring credit based on current unemployment or non-
participation may not send employers much of a bad signal. Kroft et al. (2013) provide
evidence consistent with this idea. In particular, they find evidence that employers pay
attention to labor market conditions in interpreting unemployment as a negative signal.
While employers are less likely to call back those unemployed for a longer spell, the
stigmatizing effect of a long unemployment spell is weaker in a slacker labor market.
Conversely, of course, the effectiveness of such credits in helping the long-term un-
employed as the labor market tightens could decline, as stigma concerns associated
with long-term unemployment strengthen.
Another factor that may boost the effects of hiring credits in the context of a severe
economic downturn is the construction of incentives for new hiring. To create the stron-
gest incentives for employers to create jobs they would not have created absent the credit,
and to minimize windfalls to employers, a hiring credit has to identify and reward net
(positive) changes in employment that would not have occurred otherwise. Such problems
may be particularly problematic for low-skilled or disadvantaged workers, who have high
turnover, and may present employers with opportunities to claim credits for repeated hir-
ing of workers that would have occurred anyway because of this turnover. Designing hir-
ing credits that reduce windfalls and incentivize new hiring can require more information
from firms, imposing large administrative costs that undermine the job creation goals of
these credits by effectively reducing the value of the credit. However, it is likely easier to
get the incentives for new hiring right when using hiring credits in a period of anemic job
growth. When employment is largely stagnant (or falling), rewarding hiring in a simple
manner is less likely to deliver windfalls to firms that would be hiring anyway, hence mak-
ing it easier to keep administrative costs low. Similarly, a credit targeting the unemployed
should be simple to administer, as it is easy to verify unemployment status.
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countercyclical credits—in contrast to credits targeting the disadvantaged—have been
rare. The federal New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) was in effect from mid-1977 to the end
of 1978, to help spur recovery after the recession earlier in the 1970s (Katz, 1998). The
NJTC was “non-categorical” rather than targeting specific groups and used a simple
way to reward hiring—offering the credit to firms in which employment rose by more
than 2 % and paying up to 50 % of the first $4200 in wages per new hire, up to a max-
imum of $100,000 per firm in a year.4 More recently, the Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment (HIRE) Act targeted those entering employment from unemployment or
out of the labor force, using an exemption from the employer’s share of Social Security
taxes due for March to December 2010, plus an additional $1000 credit per worker.
Based on a few studies of the NJTC (see Neumark, 2013, for more discussion), Katz
(1998) suggests that the evidence supports the conclusion that a “temporary, noncategori-
cal, incremental employment subsidy” like the NJTC has some potential for creating job
growth. However, as is usually the case with federal policies, the effect of the NJTC is hard
to distinguish from other time-series changes. Regardless, any such evidence is old. There
are no solid evaluations of the HIRE Act.
More recent and potentially more promising evidence can be obtained from state-
level hiring credits. Neumark and Grijalva (2013) document an extensive set of state
hiring credits—many enacted during and after the Great Recession. This study assem-
bled a database on state hiring credits, restricting attention to broad, statewide pro-
grams that offered credits to employers for creating (or retaining) jobs. Focusing to
some extent on hiring credits adopted during or after the Great Recession, this data-
base is used to estimate difference-in-differences models that compare job growth in
states that did and did not implement particular types of hiring credits, controlling for
other factors to isolate the effects of state hiring credits.5
States offer a complex package of incentives ranging from tax incentives based on
different criteria (e.g., job creation) to financial assistance, technical support, training, incen-
tives for creation of infrastructure, etc. Neumark and Grijalva restrict attention to programs
intended to create (or retain) jobs, based on the following criteria: (1) the program’s law or
regulations require firms to create or retain jobs or to increase payroll; programs aimed at
attracting new companies to the state (e.g., headquarters programs) are also included since
by definition they create new jobs and, in most cases, they include an explicit job creation
requirement; (2) the program is broad in the sense that it covers a large portion of the state’s
firms or employees; (3) the program is targeted directly at the employer that is creating jobs;
for instance, they do not include programs that foster infrastructure improvement by local
governments on behalf of a business that is creating jobs; (4) the program is not geographic-
ally targeted. In particular, enterprise zone programs and local hiring programs are ex-
cluded;6 and (5) the program’s costs are not borne by local governments; in particular,
property tax abatements and tax increment financing districts are not included.
Also excluded are programs based on training, apprenticeships, or internships, on re-
search and development, or those related to the film industry; and agricultural or finan-
cial programs (e.g., programs that provide loans or whose benefits are reductions in the
interest rate on previous loans). In contrast, programs that have broad targeting by
industry (e.g., manufacturing), by company type (e.g., small businesses), or groups of
workers (e.g., the unemployed) are included.
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adopted nearly 150 different types of hiring credits. Figure 1 shows the number of new
hiring credits implemented each year (from 1969 to 2012). The figure shows that many
of these were enacted during and after the Great Recession (9 during the Great
Recession and 21 afterwards), which can help provide evidence on whether these
credits helped counter-recessionary efforts. There are 45 states that had at least one
hiring credit at some point during the whole period. The five states that did not have
any program are Alaska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming.
There are also five states that had at most one program: Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota,
Montana, and Oregon. The remaining 40 states had two or more hiring credits over
the period, and of these, most had two to four credits.
Moreover, a variety of state credits were adopted. The database captures many types
of hiring credits, but there are some limitations. First, there is no clear way to distin-
guish between “small” and “large” programs, since spending is endogenous to firms’ de-
cisions, so credits with similar features are treated as homogeneous. Second, for the
subperiod capturing the Great Recession and after, there is not that much variation in
credits offered. The small number of credits that turn on during the sample period also
make it impractical to simultaneously estimate the effects of many (or all) types of hir-
ing credits. Instead, the paper focuses on estimating the effects of “one-way” classifica-
tions of hiring credits.
There is an issue of how to measure hiring credit programs. Much of the variation in
hiring credits comes from states where a program already existed, sometimes of the
same type. For example, in the aggregate, of the 38 programs created from January
2006 to December 2011, 36 were added in states that already had at least one program.
Neumark and Grijalva chose to code simply the existence of a credit of a particular
type, rather than the number of credits, but the key results (discussed below) were not
sensitive to instead using a count of credits by type.
Perhaps the most important control variable is a counterfactual business cycle meas-
ure, intended to capture what the impact of the recession in each state would have
been absent a state’s hiring credit(s). This is constructed by applying national time-
series changes in disaggregated industry employment to the state, based on the state’s
industry composition in a baseline period of stable aggregate economic growth (as inFig. 1 Number of New Hiring Credits Each Year. Source: Neumark and Grijalva (2013)
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ance (UI) benefits during and after the Great Recession, which could have slowed job
growth, and for minimum wages. In addition, the model controls for other major fed-
eral efforts to counteract the Great Recession, with monthly spending, by state, on the
federal stimulus (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, or ARRA), enacted in
2009.8
Results for the Great Recession period are reported in Table 1. Each panel in the
table reports estimates looking at different ways of breaking down hiring credits; the
second, for example, reports estimates of the effects of credits distinguishing between
credits based on new job growth, new payroll growth, new investment, or other criteria.
The specifications include contemporaneous dummy variables for the hiring credits,
plus 12 monthly lags, and the table reports the contemporaneous coefficients, and then
the cumulative effect including lags through 4, 8, and 12 months. Perhaps echoing the
often-negative assessment of hiring credits discussed earlier, for many types of hiring
credits, the evidence does not point to significant effects on job growth. However, for
some types of credits there is evidence of positive effects—often for credits for which
we might expect better outcomes.
First, hiring credits vary in terms of tax treatment. Credits may limit the benefit to be
equal to the tax liability, or they may allow it to be higher than the tax liability, by let-
ting firms carry credits forward to future years, or making the credit refundable. Re-
fundable hiring credits should have the greatest impact because they are valuable even
if the firm has no tax liability—which is more likely during a recession. Second, many
programs try to strengthen job creation effects by allowing “recapture” or “clawbacks”
of credits if net job creation is lower than required for payment of the credit.9 We
would expect a recapture mechanism to lead to more effective credits, by either enfor-
cing job creation goals or encouraging only firms that could actually meet them to
apply for credits. Third, as discussed above, credits targeting the unemployed during a
period such as the Great Recession should not stigmatize eligible workers.
As the table shows (italicized results), the estimated effects of refundable hiring
credits are positive, but not statistically significant. For hiring credits with recapture
provisions, the estimates are large and statistically significant (at the 5 or 10 % level)
through 4, 8, and 12 months. The same is true for hiring credits targeting the un-
employed, which have positive and statistically significant effects for all of the cumulative
effects reported in the table.10
Thus, the evidence from Table 1 suggests that a limited number of specific types of
hiring credits enacted during the Great Recession succeeded in boosting employ-
ment—specifically, credits that allow for recapture of payments if the required goals
were not met and credits targeting the unemployed.11 Moreover, the magnitudes some-
times appear quite large. For example, the point estimate for credits targeting the un-
employed implies that such a credit boosts employment by 1.16 % after 12 months. We
do not have measures of spending on such credits from the states that adopted them,
but it is highly unlikely that states spent anything close to 1.16 % of payrolls within
their borders on these credits, suggesting the benefits could well outweigh the costs.12
Heaton (2012) provides additional evidence on hiring credits adopted during (or just
before) the Great Recession, examining the 2007 expansion of the (Work Opportunities
Tax Credit, or WOTC) for veterans entitled to compensation for a service-connected
Table 1 Estimated effects of state hiring credits on employment growth, 2007-2011
Credit variable(s) Contemp. +4 lags +8 lags +12 lags Credit variable(s) Contemp. +4 lags +8 lags +12 lags
A. ARRA variable Contemp. +6 lags +12 lags +24 lags
ARRA −0.0017 0.0002 −0.0001 0.0017
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0037)
Credit 0.0011 −0.0014 −0.0067 −0.0084 E. Wage requirement −0.0007 0.0023 0.0033 0.0026
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0040)
B. Jobs 0.0016 −0.0008 −0.0035 −0.0066 No wage requirement −0.0008 −0.0050 −0.0082 −0.0135
(0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0104)
Payroll −0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 −0.0004 F. Recapture 0.0033 0.0057 0.0064 0.0082
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0042)
Investment 0.0091 0.0060 0.0053 0.0044 No recapture 0.0027 −0.0015 −0.0040 −0.0049
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0034)
Others 0.0007 −0.0034 −0.0059 −0.0076 G. Industry 0.0001 −0.0042 −0.0068 −0.0094
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0062) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0036)
C. Full-time 0.0014 0.0004 −0.0019 −0.0018 Manufacturing −0.0011 −0.0090 −0.0091 −0.0132
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0038) (0.0058) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0049)
Full-time equiv. −0.0050 −0.0076 −0.0091 −0.0177 No targeting 0.0019 0.0003 −0.0041 −0.0051
(0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0040)
Part-time … … 0.0006 0.0092 H.Unemployed 0.0061 0.0084 0.0082 0.0116
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0045)
Not specified 0.0009 −0.0027 −0.0049 −0.0055 Welfare recipient … … … …
(0.0010) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0050)
D. Equal to tax owed −0.0049 −0.0072 −0.0115 −0.0247 Disabled −0.0094 0.0015 0.0034 0.0036













Table 1 Estimated effects of state hiring credits on employment growth, 2007-2011 (Continued)
Carry-forward 0.0012 −0.0009 −0.0049 −0.0051 No targeting 0.0012 −0.0014 −0.0069 −0.0084
(0.0010) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0086) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0051)
Refundable 0.0012 0.0027 0.0055 0.0017 I. Temporary −0.0010 −0.0032 −0.0032 −0.0049
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0061) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0080)
Not specified 0.0028 0.0003 −0.0014 −0.0018 Permanent 0.0009 −0.0030 −0.0064 −0.0081
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0035)
Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of QCEW employment. The specification includes the first difference of the job credit dummy or dummies and 12 lags of this first difference. In addition
to the contemporaneous effect, cumulative effects through 4, 8, and 12 lags are reported. Each panel reports a different specification. The first includes a single dummy variable for whether there is a credit, the
second includes dummy variables for whether there is a credit with each of the four possible bases for benefits, etc. The specification also includes the following: the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of the first
difference of the state-specific shock variable (in logs); interactions of the first difference of the shock variable interacted with state dummy variables; the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of the first difference of
the log of the minimum wage prevailing in the state; the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of the first difference of the control for extended UI benefits; dummy variable for the political party of the governor
(measured annually); dummy variables for each month in the sample; and interactions between calendar month dummy variables and state dummy variables. We add contemporaneous ARRA-obligated spending, and
24 lags, in logs; zeros are replaced with ones in levels before taking logs. (Cumulative effects through 6, 12, and 24 lags are reported.) We also add dummy variables for the quintiles of housing price appreciation for
the 2000–2006 period interacted with calendar month dummy variables. We report estimates of the coefficients of ARRA spending only for the first specification; results were similar for the other models. The cyclical
control is constructed using 2006 as the baseline year. The data are monthly. There are 2950 observations. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the state level
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employed for at least 6 of the past 12 months before being hired. Heaton uses
American Community Survey (ACS) data that allow him to classify eligible workers
as well as plausible comparison groups—non-disabled veterans who were dis-
charged in the past 12 months or unemployed for at least 6 of the past 12 months.
He also uses the data to add additional levels of differencing that strengthen iden-
tification, such as subtracting out differences between disabled and non-disabled
non-veterans that would meet the unemployment criterion, or disabled and non-
disabled veterans who do not meet the discharge or unemployment criteria. The
evidence points roughly to a two percentage point relative increase in employment
for disabled veterans who were eligible for the credit. This evidence is more posi-
tive than past work on narrowly targeted hiring incentives, which may be related
to an absence of stigma (and perhaps even positive attributions) for veterans, as
opposed to economically disadvantaged workers.132.2 Subsidized wages
Aggressive wage subsidies were also implemented in response to the Great Recession.
The ARRA included a $5 billion TANF Emergency Fund, under which states could get
substantial reimbursement for subsidizing jobs, which led to the largest expansion of
public employment since the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in
the 1970s.14 States were not limited to creating subsidized jobs programs for families re-
ceiving TANF, and many chose a broader target population, using a higher-income thresh-
old, extending the program to the long-term unemployed, etc. (Farrell et al., 2011).
Early studies of these programs focused on implementation—how many subsidized
job placements were made. More recent research, however, has tried to provide evi-
dence on the effects of the programs, although very little supports causal inferences.
There is an issue of how these programs should be evaluated. It seems most natural to
evaluate subsidized jobs programs, like training programs, based on post-participation
effects on employment and earnings. However, Pavetti et al. (2011) argue that counter-
cyclical programs intended to keep people working during a downturn should be
evaluated based on the number of unemployed people placed in jobs, regardless of how
long-term the effects are, as, for example, these jobs might be viewed as a substitute for
going on unemployment insurance (UI).
The evidence shows that the program overall resulted in a large number of job place-
ments—approximately 260,000 placements of low-income parents and youth in subsi-
dized jobs during 2009 and 2010 (Warland et al., n.d.), half of these representing
summer jobs for youths (Farrell et al., 2011). In addition, evidence from surveys of
participating employers (Roder and Elliott, 2013) points to strong support for these
programs (not surprisingly viewed only through the lens of the wage subsidy), and
Lower-Basch (2011) reports that states found more employers willing to hire the target
population than they could accommodate. The large level of placements, if nothing
else, differs from criticisms of low take-up for hiring credit programs (e.g., Hamersma,
2003), often attributed to both administrative costs and stigma.
The stigma associated with these wage subsidies may have been lower because of
their adoption following a severe recession, when many people were unemployed
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ing the unemployed) and because eligibility for Emergency Fund subsidies was broad
compared to earlier credits narrowly targeting the disadvantaged. For example, some
states set eligibility based on family income above 200 % of the poverty line (Pavetti
et al., 2011). In addition, subsidies of 100 % may have allayed employer concerns about
worker quality since they could terminate the worker without having incurred any
direct wage costs. Also, in some cases the employer of record was a non-profit
intermediary or workforce agency, protecting firms where workers were placed from
adverse impacts on their UI tax rating and other legal liability (Lower-Basch, 2011).15
Did these wage subsidies lead to job creation? A high number of placements does not
imply that the same number of people would not have found jobs absent the wage sub-
sidies, in which case the subsidies would have largely been windfalls to employers. In-
deed, Lower-Basch (2011) reports anecdotal evidence that, because program operators
under the TANF Emergency Fund programs were working under a very tight time
frame and wanted to make maximum use of the funds, they did not prioritize keeping
windfalls low but rather focused on minimizing the burden of the program on em-
ployers and bringing the program to scale. Moreover, she notes that states did not at-
tempt to set up means of evaluating whether there were net job creation effects.
Reflecting this, her discussion of job subsidy programs created under the TANF Emergency
Fund mainly reports enrollment numbers.16
Another type of evidence that does not address program effects comes from surveys
of employers or program administrators. Pavetti et al. (2011) report that administrators
of subsidized employment programs surveyed by telephone claimed that the subsidies
helped some small businesses expand, although it would be preferable to obtain this
(still subjective) information from employers. Roder and Elliott (2013) conducted a tele-
phone survey of employers who took part in job subsidy programs in three states and
report that 63 % said they created new positions in order to hire the subsidized
workers. Of course, employers may have a vested interested in giving a positive assess-
ment of a program that is to their financial advantage.
Turning to the question of post-program effects, many descriptions of TANF
Emergency Fund job subsidy programs note a high degree of placement in
unsubsidized jobs after program completion. Lower-Basch (2011) notes that several
states and counties reported “retention rates ranging from 10 to 50 percent” (p. 10) and
describes a Boston program in which 46 % of graduates obtained unsubsidized employ-
ment after the program ended. However, this does not compare experiences of partici-
pants and non-participants.
More compelling evidence comes from an earlier evaluation of the State of Washington’s
Community Jobs Program, which targeted TANF recipients facing significant employment
barriers and paid for both wages and support services, using for placement contractors
who received incentive payments (Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2005). This
study found higher employment of enrollees in subsidized jobs in a 2-year follow-up, rela-
tive to comparable matched TANF clients who did not participate—by 14–24 %. There
was also a higher incidence of more continuous employment in the follow-up
period. Washington did run a job subsidy program under the TANF Emergency
Fund (“Job Connection”), but no comparable data with which to estimate the ef-
fects of the program seem to be available.
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program—the Florida Back to Work Program. Using Florida UI records, Roder and
Elliott (2013) study participants and non-participants who were eligible for the pro-
gram, finding similar employment rates and earnings in the four quarters prior to the
program, but higher earnings and employment in the four quarters after the program
ended (a difference-in-difference earnings estimate of $2471).17 One finding, which
perhaps circles back to the evidence from Neumark and Grijalva (2013) on credits tar-
geting the unemployed, is that earnings gains for the long-term unemployed were also
apparent, of about the same magnitude as the overall effect.18
Lower-Basch (2011) suggests that these more positive conclusions compared to the
research on effects of past hiring credits targeting the disadvantaged may be attribut-
able to the discretionary nature of the TANF Emergency Fund job subsidy programs, in
which administrating agencies were “able to select both employers and workers to par-
ticipate” (p. 2). In contrast, programs like the WOTC were available to any employer
who hires from the targeted population and files the required paperwork. Her hypoth-
esis seems especially plausible if agencies received incentives for placements that lasted
or led to post-program employment.19
Reading about the evidence on wage subsidies, and how employers responded to
them, suggests that they operated as “unpaid internships” for the less advantaged.
There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence from the popular media about the import-
ance of unpaid internships as a precursor to paid employment for young people in to-
day’s labor market. My casual observation, though, is that these unpaid internships are
much more feasible for those in higher-income families with parents who can provide
support during a period with no income. Perhaps we need to consider making the same
kinds of opportunities available to labor market entrants or others who do not have
these means of support, although admittedly how to structure such a program is a
challenge. Perhaps by making such opportunities available a limited number of times to
each person, and restricting subsidies to jobs with training and growth opportunities,
participants would use their subsidy strategically to enhance their labor market
prospects. Such opportunities may overcome barriers to employment that arise because
employers underestimate worker skills or perceive wide variability in skills and are risk
averse with regard to this uncertainty.2.3 Promising strategies for the long-term unemployed?
In response to continuing problems of long-term unemployment, the Obama Adminis-
tration has been securing promises from companies not to discriminate against the
long-term unemployed,20 and, earlier, the President’s proposed American Jobs Act
would have prohibited employers from discriminating against unemployed workers
when hiring.21 The latter proposal would likely have been a challenge to implement
and enforce. The former may help, but could certainly be regarded skeptically: What
would a company have to gain by not agreeing to sign such a pledge?
The research on state hiring credits and TANF Emergency Fund wage subsidy pro-
grams, however, finds some evidence of success of policies targeting the long-term un-
employed. The evidence that state hiring credits targeting the unemployed (often the
long-term unemployed) are associated with job creation is indirect in that we do not
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Program is more direct, although the program did not specifically target the long-term
unemployed but rather those with incomes below 200 % of the poverty line with chil-
dren who were TANF eligible.3 Increasing income from work
3.1 The EITC
The original intent of the EITC in the USA was to boost incomes of low-income
families, although it has also been viewed as a means of encouraging work (Eissa
and Hoynes, 2011). Figure 2 shows key features of the federal EITC as of 2014.
First, it provides supplemental income only to those who are working (with posi-
tive earnings). Second, it provides a growing subsidy on the upward sloping part
of the schedule (the “phase-in” range), and then at higher income, a higher impli-
cit tax rate as the subsidy is phased out. Third, the subsidy value varies sharply
with the number of eligible children. The subsidy and maximum payment are
trivial for those without children, but both are much higher for those with chil-
dren. For example, for a family with two children, in 2014 the maximum credit
that could be earned was $5460, based on a 40 % subsidy over the first $13,650
in earnings. Finally, note that the EITC is based on family income and hence will
go to low-income families, and often single-parent families, which have particu-
larly high poverty rates.
The structure of the EITC implies that it creates positive employment incentives on
the extensive margin, because for those initially not working there is only a positive
substitution effect. On the phase-in range, there are offsetting income and substitution
effects, but if the substitution effect dominates, there are also positive labor supply ef-
fects on the intensive margin. However, on the “plateau” when the EITC is fixed and
on the phaseout range there are negative income effects, and on the phaseout range















Childless 1 child 2 children 3+ children
Fig. 2 Earned income tax credit by income and number of children. Notes: The number of children refers
to the number of eligible children in the tax unit. Source: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/
displayafact.cfm?DocID=36&Topic2id=40&Topic3id=42 (viewed October 23, 2014)
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assuming that substitution effects dominate).
Despite these potential labor supply disincentives for some, the EITC has two key
strengths. First, it targets low-income families well, with a large proportion of EITC
payments going to poor and low-income families (Liebman, 1998). And second, the
EITC is a pro-work policy, boosting employment and earnings particularly among sin-
gle mothers who have low income and might not work absent the EITC, especially if
their children are young (Hotz and Scholz, 2003).
One reason the EITC might be more effective than hiring credits at creating jobs is
that it presumably does not generate stigma effects, since the employer typically has no
idea whether an employee is eligible for or receiving the EITC.22 (And as a policy to in-
crease income from work, for the many people already employed who get an EITC pay-
ment, stigma is irrelevant.) However, the EITC is likely to be less effective at creating
jobs in a period of slack aggregate labor demand, when increased labor supply would
not lead to higher employment.23 Also, by its structure, the EITC generates large
amounts of payments to people who are not induced to enter the labor market and
hence generates very large windfalls if viewed as a job creation tool. Reflecting this,
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the costs of creating jobs via hiring
credits targeting the unemployed probably range from about $9100 to $75,000 per job,
and likely in the lower half of that range if multiplier effects are significant, whereas
costs per job created via the EITC are more likely in the range of $50,000 to $117,000
(Neumark, 2013). Moreover, some research bears out the predicted labor supply reduc-
tions among those already working, especially second workers in families. Nonetheless,
the evidence points to a positive overall impact of the EITC on women’s labor supply
(Keane and Moffitt, 1998; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001) and on aggregate labor supply,
although the aggregate effect is not large (about 20 million hours) relative to total labor
input (Dickert et al., 1995). Thus, the EITC should be probably viewed mainly as a tool
for increasing income from work, which also has some positive employment incentives.
Most recently, attention has focused on a substantial expansion of the EITC for
childless adults (meaning the person has no qualifying children), for whom the EITC
paid a maximum of $496 (in 2014), less than one-tenth of the maximum credit for fam-
ilies with two or more children. President Obama recently proposed increasing the
maximum credit to $1000, as well as increasing the income level at which the credit is
fully phased out, so that more low-income childless people will benefit from the higher
credit.24 An expansion of the EITC for childless adults would create additional incen-
tives for employment of eligible individuals, as well as boosting incomes of those
employed. The higher-income level at which the credit is fully phased out would have
the latter effect but also increase the number of people for whom there would be labor
supply disincentives.
The EITC targets poor and low-income families well and has boosted earnings (and
employment) among single mothers—who have perhaps been the principal group tar-
geted by the policy (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Liebman, 1998; Scholz, 1994). Past work
focused on the federal EITC, but in more recent work, Neumark and Wascher (2011)
estimated the effects of state expansions in the EITC in the 2000s; in the period they
studied, from 1996 to 2007, the number of states with a higher EITC increased from 7
states to 19 states and the District of Columbia, boosting the percentage of the 16–64-
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nearly 40 %.25 The state variation permits more rigorous identification of the effects of
the EITC, by comparing changes across states, over time, for families with the same
number of children, in states with differential changes in the EITC.
This work estimates the effects of the EITC on the probability that a family’s earnings
are below the poverty line, and below one-half the poverty line (“extreme poverty”).
Given that the EITC also results in transfers to eligible families, the benefits are likely
greater than those found for earnings, although some transfer income may decline in
response to higher earnings. Regardless, focusing on earnings captures the incentive ef-
fects of the EITC, and in that sense, this analysis provides a rather strict test of the
power of the EITC to increase income from work, by excluding the work-contingent
transfers of the EITC (which are also excluded from official US poverty calculations).
Key results are reported in Table 2. The generosity of the EITC is measured by the
percentage state supplement to the federal EITC. Because the EITC is much more gen-
erous for families with children, the coefficient on the interaction between the EITC
and an indicator for the presence of dependent children age 18 or under in the home
(which is what is measured in the Current Population Survey (CPS)) is viewed as cap-
turing the effect of the EITC. The main effect could be interpreted as the effect of the
EITC on those without children, but this parameter more likely reflects the effects of
shocks specific to state and year cells that are correlated with the EITC. The EITC ×
kids interaction is then a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator, identifying
the effect of the EITC from the differential effect for those with and without children,
which cannot be done using federal EITC variation only.
The evidence shows that state-level EITCs are associated with reductions in the pro-
portion of affected families with very low earnings. The negative estimates are larger
when the sample is restricted to families headed by single females or families headed byTable 2 Estimated effects of EITC on family earnings relative to poverty, family heads, or
individuals, aged 21–44, 1997–2006













EITC × kids −.04 (.07) −.16 (.17) −.24 (.18) .06 (.28)
EITC −.00 (.05) −.06 (.08) −.02 (.10) −.12 (.18)
P(earnings < .5 poverty)
EITC × kids −.09 (.06) −.34 (.18) −.42 (.23) −.14 (.25)
EITC .02 (.04) .00 (.06) .05 (.09) −.14 (.14)
N 362,811 98,327 65,839 34,267
Notes: All estimates are weighted, and standard errors are clustered on states. Linear probability estimates are reported.
The regression also includes controls for the number of children, dummy variables for education (high-school dropout,
high-school degree, some college, bachelor’s degree or higher), dummy variables for number of children as well as the
number of children under age six (all observed values), dummy variables for marital status (never married; married
spouse present; married spouse absent; and divorced, widowed, or separated), dummy variables for black or Hispanic,
age and its square, the state unemployment rate, and state and year fixed effects. In addition, the model includes a full
set of interactions between kids and both the year dummy variables and the state dummy variables. The estimated
coefficients of the EITC-kids interactions are robust to including state-specific linear trends, or state-year interactions; in the
latter specifications, the main EITC effect drops out. The sample is restricted to heads of families, primary individuals, or
unrelated individuals.
Source: Neumark and Wascher (2011), using CPS Annual Demographic Files
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nority women. The estimates are not statistically significant for the poverty line regres-
sions, but two of them are for the probability that family earnings are below one-half of
the poverty line. Overall, this evidence bolsters earlier conclusions that the federal
EITC helps low-income families, in this case by boosting earnings.26, 27 And of course
it also shows that state-level EITCs are effective.
The core argument for expanding the EITC for individuals without eligible children
is to offset the long-run decline in real wages for low-skilled men. Multiple benefits of
a more generous EITC—acting via both increased earnings and higher employment—are
conjectured. Higher returns to work can have longer-run impacts on earnings through
the accumulation of labor market experience. Berlin (2007) also suggests that higher
income for low-skill men may make them more attractive marriage partners, helping
reverse declines in marriage and increases in out-of-wedlock childbearing, and reduce
crime by increasing the relative returns to market work versus illicit sources of income.
Gitterman et al. (2008) suggest that an expanded EITC for individuals without qualifying
children could partly go to child support owed by non-custodial parents with responsibil-
ity for children; Carrasso et al. (2008) point out that many non-custodial fathers face high
marginal tax rates because of child support payments, which a subsidy from an expanded
EITC could help offset.
What does the evidence say about the potential benefits of expanding the EITC for
those without children? There is evidence for men from New Hope, a program that
offered work-contingent supplements to single men and generally produced positive
effects on employment, earnings, and family income, even up to 5 years after the pro-
gram, although many of the estimated effects are not significant (Duncan et al.: The
persistence of New Hope’s labor market impacts: How long? How real?, Unpublished).28
I am not aware of evidence on crime, but recent work by Autor et al. (The labor mar-
ket and the marriage market: how adverse employment shocks affect marriage, fertility,
and children’s living circumstances, Unpublished) suggests that exogenous labor de-
mand shocks that reduce employment opportunities for less-skilled males lead to lower
marriage rates and more teen births as well as more children living in single-parent or
poor households.29
However, it is important to keep in mind that if the EITC strengthens employment
incentives for one group; it may increase competition with other groups and hence can
lower their earnings. For example, Neumark and Wascher (2011) show that the current
EITC, which boosts employment of single mothers, has some negative spillover effects
on other less-skilled individuals who are “ineligible” for the EITC but who compete for
jobs with the new labor force entrants.
Using similar specifications to those described above, Neumark and Wascher esti-
mate the effects of the EITC on individuals who seem likely to be substitutes for
women benefiting from the EITC—less-educated childless men and women between
the ages of 21 and 34, less-skilled subgroups among these, such as less-skilled minor-
ities, and finally less-skilled minority single men. As shown in Table 3, for less-
educated, childless individuals, the estimated EITC effects on wages, employment, and
earnings are negative, although not statistically significant. However, for less-educated
blacks and Hispanics the estimated effects of the EITC on employment and earnings
are negative and statistically significant, and the point estimates are larger. The results
Table 3 Estimated effects of EITC on low-skilled, childless individuals, aged 21–34, 1997–2006
(1) (2) (3)





black or Hispanic men
Log wages
EITC × low-skill −.10 (.09) −.11 (.08) −.13 (.09)
EITC .08 (.07) .06 (.10) .08 (.11)
N 131,181 79,362 67,399
Employment
EITC × low-skill −.05 (.05) −.12 (.05) −.16 (.05)
EITC .02 (.04) .03 (.03) .01 (.03)
N 150,486 90,408 74,913
Log earnings
EITC × low-skill −.58 (.49) −1.32 (.44) −1.75 (.56)
EITC .35 (.38) .40 (.37) .35 (.29)
N 150,486 90,408 74,913
Notes: Most notes from Table 2 apply, except those pertaining to variables measuring the number of children. The log
wage regressions condition on positive earnings and hours of work in the previous year. “Less-educated” means that the
individual has a high-school degree at most. The low-skilled treatment group is defined in the column heading. The
control group does not change across columns and always includes all those with at least some college (regardless of
race, ethnicity, or marital status). The estimated coefficients of the EITC-low-skill interactions are robust to including state-specific
linear trends, or state-year interactions
Source: Neumark and Wascher (2011), using CPS Annual Demographic Files
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negative effects of the EITC on wages, employment, and earnings. Other evidence re-
ported in the study indicates similar negative effects of the current EITC based on
proxies for the share of women in each state who are eligible for the EITC.
If the EITC adversely affects those with whom currently eligible women compete, the
implication is likely that if we expand the EITC for those without children, there is
likely to be some shifting of the benefits of the EITC program as a whole away from
families, as the eligible participants with children face increased labor supply from un-
related individuals. This may be an acceptable trade-off, in light of arguments for in-
creasing work incentives for those who currently get very little from the EITC. But it is
a trade-off that needs to be kept in mind.
There are a number of questions we need to know more about to assess these trade-offs.
First, would an expanded EITC increase resource flows to children of non-custodial par-
ents? Second, would a substantial employment impact from an expanded EITC enhance
earnings of men in the longer run from higher labor market experience?30 Third, do the
kinds of effects that Autor et al. (The labor market and the marriage market: how adverse
employment shocks affect marriage, fertility, and children’s living circumstances, Unpub-
lished) find carry over to the EITC? Fourth, would an expanded EITC have greater effects
on the extensive margin—hence increasing work—or on the intensive margin—hence re-
ducing labor supply of men but at the same time increasing total income (earnings plus
EITC) and raising low-skilled wages?31 Despite these unknowns, given the severity of the
labor market problems facing low-skilled men, it is probably worthwhile to implement an
expanded EITC for those without children on a modest scale, with an eye to addressing
these questions—including the trade-offs with other EITC recipients.
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are going to use public policy to try to counter rising income inequality, the EITC may
be the best tool that we have. In addition to the strengths of the EITC discussed above,
it has two other important advantages. First, it is consonant with the pro-work orienta-
tion that, in the US context, is most likely to attract bipartisan political support.
Second, the EITC is well suited to the policy objective that “no one who works
full-time should have to raise their family in poverty”,32 because the EITC targets
poor and low-income families, and its parameters can be chosen to achieve these
goals. Finally, as Mankiw has argued, the EITC redistributes income by taxing
those who earn the most (and redistributing to those who earn the least subject to
working), which seems a sensible form of redistribution.33
Some critics deride the EITC as “corporate welfare”, with taxpayers subsidizing the
low wages paid by employers, who absent the policy would pay higher wages.34 How-
ever, lower market wages are a necessary consequence of the pro-work incentives of
the EITC. Moreover, workers eligible for the EITC end up earning more per hour once
the credit is factored in—which is the reason labor supply increases. But wages for
those not eligible for the EITC will be lower, as we saw above, and Rothstein (2011)
presents simulations suggesting that employers capture substantial gains via lower
wages.35 Thus, what one makes of this criticism of the EITC hinges on the distribu-
tional goals of the policy.3.2 Mandating higher wages
Policymakers and the public have recently strongly embraced higher minimum wages to
try to increase income from work. Since the last federal minimum wage increase in 2009,
23 states have raised their minimum wage (Fig. 3). City-level minimum wages that are
much higher than state minimum wages are also being enacted at a high rate. ForFig. 3 Percent difference between state and federal minimum wages, June 2014 (23 states; average
% difference = 11.5 %)
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creased its minimum wage to $12.25, and it will increase to $15 by 2018 and be indexed
to inflation thereafter. Los Angeles will raise the minimum wage to $10.50 in 2016 and
then to $15 by 2020. And Oakland recently raised its minimum wage to $12.25 per hour.
The main argument for a minimum wage is that it helps poor and low-income fam-
ilies achieve a sufficient level of income. Such benefits would come, of course, from
higher wages for affected workers. The potential downside of a minimum wage, how-
ever, is that it may discourage employers from using low-wage, low-skill workers. If
minimum wages destroy jobs for low-skill workers, then minimum wages create both
winners and losers. Whether or not a minimum wage reduces poverty or helps low-
income families then depends on what minimum wages do to workers’ earnings, taking
account of both wage and employment (and potentially hours) effects, and where in
the distribution of family incomes the winners and losers in terms of workers’ earnings
are located. But clearly the effect on jobs is critical for the relative magnitudes of the
potential trade-offs between winners and losers.
3.2.1 Employment effects
Because the minimum wage literature covers scores of studies over many decades, I
cover the earlier literature with brief reference to prior summaries of the evidence, be-
fore turning to a spate of recent evidence. Most of the early studies of the employment
effects of minimum wages used aggregate time series data for the USA, estimating the ef-
fects of changes in the national minimum wage on employment rates of 16—19-year-olds
(“teens”) or 16–24-year-olds (“young adults”). A comprehensive summary of these
early studies found elasticities for teen employment clustered between −0.1 and −0.3
(Brown et al., 1982).
Research beginning in the early 1990s exploited an increasing number of states
raising their minimum wages above the federal minimum. This variation made it
possible to compare changes in youth employment between states that did and did not
raise their minimum wage—the latter serving as “controls”—helping to untangle the
effects of minimum wages from other aggregate influences on youth employment. The
range of estimated employment effects widened, in part because the state variation in
minimum wages presented researchers with a greater variety of ways to estimate em-
ployment effects.
Neumark and Wascher (2007) surveyed evidence from more than 100 studies from
this new generation of research—most for the USA. The survey did not simply tabulate
the estimates, but rather provided an attempt to identify the most reliable studies and
to summarize the evidence from them. It concluded that the strong preponderance of
the evidence points to disemployment effects. Nearly two thirds of all the studies sur-
veyed gave consistent evidence of negative (although not always statistically significant)
effects of minimum wages, while only eight gave a relatively consistent indication of
positive employment effects. In addition, among the 33 that were viewed as providing
the most credible evidence, 28, or 85 %, pointed to negative employment effects. More-
over, disemployment effects of minimum wages were strongest when researchers fo-
cused on the least-skilled workers most affected by minimum wages. One might
disagree with the authors’ assessment of the most reliable studies, but it is, nonetheless,
most accurate to characterize the overall literature this survey covers as providing a
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likely to be affected by minimum wages.
Some recent research, however, strongly contests the conclusion that minimum
wages cause job loss. One challenge comes from meta-analyses—or appeals to averages
of estimates across studies (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009, hereafter DS; Belman and
Wolfson, 2014). As a prime example, Schmitt (2013) emphasizes evidence from DS,
shown in Fig. 4. Schmitt’s key argument is that the estimates are “heavily clustered at
or near zero employment effects” (p. 4). That might be a reasonable first impression
from the figure. But as DS report, the mean across the studies summarized in the graph
is around −0.19, although it is hard to discern this because the vertical line in the figure
is drawn at zero, and—despite most credible studies of minimum wages yielding elasti-
cities in the range of, say, −0.5 to 0.1—in the figure the elasticities range from near to
−20 to 5 (that is, 40 to 50 times larger than the endpoints of this range), making it very
hard to see the graph’s central tendency.36
In fact, DS focus more on the issue of publication bias in the published literature on
minimum wages. However, it is very hard to distinguish between publication bias and
other sources of patterns in the published evidence consistent with publication bias.
For example, meta-analyses like Doucouliagos and Stanley argue that if published nega-
tive estimates of minimum wage effects have larger standard errors, this is evidence of
publication bias. However, the same phenomenon can arise if studies using better re-
search designs lead to “truer” estimates, which happen to be negative, and which have
larger standard errors because they demand more of the data.
Moreover, averaging across estimates from studies of minimum wage effects, as
meta-analyses do, is problematic. First, the population studied varies, and this and
other factors can influence how binding the minimum wage is, generating variation in
estimated effects that there is no reason to simply average. For example, Neumark and
Wascher (2007) document how studies that more sharply focus on workers most likely
to be affected by minimum wage increases reveal clearer evidence of disemploy-
ment effects. Among other factors potentially influencing the magnitude of theFig. 4 Estimated minimum wage effects in the literature. Source: Schmitt (2013)
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well in a linear or log-linear model (Neumark and Wascher, 2002; Thompson,
2009), and which can influence whether minor non-employment adjustments such
as converting benefits to wages can accommodate the increase, or whether employ-
ment reductions are more likely.
Second, meta-analyses often assign more weight to estimates that are more statisti-
cally precise (e.g., Belman and Wolfson, 2014), even though the most rigorous empir-
ical methods are likely to be less precise—exactly what we see in many of the new
papers discussed below—because of more rigorous research designs. Yet it is precisely
the studies using the most rigorous methods—if valid—that that should receive the
most (if not all the) weight. Moreover, if we think the studies using less-rigorous
methods (e.g., failing to instrument for an endogenous policy, or using a less-saturated
model that does not account for some sources of heterogeneity bias) lead to biased esti-
mates, we should not incorporate these studies at all in “aggregating” across the re-
search literature—even less should we up-weight the biased estimates because they
have smaller standard errors. For example, as discussed below, Dube (2011) argues that
much of the state panel data research was invalid, and generating causal estimates of
the effects of minimum wages requires comparing geographically close areas. If he is
right, then there is no reason to include the state panel data studies in averages of esti-
mated minimum wage effects, and more generally, geographically-proximate methods
should not be down-weighted because they produce less precise estimates, which they
do (Neumark et al., 2014a). In short, in economic research there really is no substitute
for critical evaluation of alternative studies to select those we view as most rigorous.
The meta-analysis “paradigm” for combining estimates from many similar studies—say,
randomized trials of a drug (Hunt, 1997)—carries over poorly to the minimum wage lit-
erature (and likely many other literatures in economics), although it can still be useful
in identifying features of studies that lead to differences in estimates (as in, for example,
work on the returns to schooling by Ashenfelter et al., 1999).
A second challenge to the conclusion that minimum wages cause job loss
comes from the studies of Allegretto et al. (2011) and Dube et al. (2010). These
studies speculate that state minimum wages tend to increase in states and years
when labor market conditions for less-skilled workers were in decline relative to
other states and relative to labor market conditions for other workers in the same
state, generating a spurious negative relationship between minimum wages and
low-skilled employment. These studies also assert that restricting comparisons to
what happens in nearby states when minimum wages increase in one state but
not another solves this problem because it removes spatial heterogeneity in these
negative shocks, and the studies find that estimated employment effects from this
approach are near zero.37
However, Neumark et al. (2014a, 2014b) present evidence that nearby state (or cross-
border) counties do not provide better controls for estimating the employment effects
of minimum wages, and that using controls picked more by the data than by assump-
tion supports the conclusion that minimum wages reduce employment of less-skilled
workers, for teens, in particular, for whom they estimate employment elasticities near
−0.15. They also suggest that using geographically-proximate comparisons can lead to
bias against finding disemployment effects of minimum wages, because nearby states
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changes, than with respect to other more exogenous factors that vary across more
disparate states, and minimum wages are more likely to be raised when youth labor
markets are stronger.38 Most recently, Allegretto et al. (2015) offer some rebuttals to
these criticisms.
Additional analyses that wrestle with this issue of the choice of controls reach differ-
ent conclusions, although nearly all point to disemployment effects. Totty (2014) uses a
factor model that is a bit more flexible than the standard panel data approach but still
not as flexible as letting the data freely dictate what the control states are. He concludes
that the estimated employment effects for restaurant workers are close to zero, while
for teens estimates are in the 0 to −0.13 range, but mostly close to zero and statistically
insignificant. In contrast, Powell (Synthetic control estimation beyond case studies:
does the minimum wage decrease teen employment?, Unpublished) improves upon
Neumark et al. (2014b) to develop a synthetic control approach that can be applied to
the minimum wage case with multiple treatments and continuous variation and which
simultaneously estimates the weights on different states as controls as well as the mini-
mum wage effect. This appears to be the most satisfactory and flexible approach, to
date, of letting the data choose control states, and generates a statistically significant es-
timated elasticity for teens of −0.10.
Baskaya and Rubinstein (Using federal minimum wage effects to identify the impact
of minimum wages on employment and earnings across U.S. states, Unpublished) also
confront the issue of an endogenous relationship between teen employment and mini-
mum wages, but using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. They instrument for
state minimum wages with the federal minimum wage interacted with the propensity
for states to let the federal minimum wage bind, purging the estimated minimum wage
effect of the variation that could come from state policymakers responding to state-
level economic conditions. Consistent with minimum wages being increased when
youth labor market conditions are strong—in contrast to the conjecture in
Allegretto et al. and Dube et al.—their IV estimates point to stronger disemployment
effects than many past studies, with an elasticity of employment for teenagers that is often
closer to −0.5.
Clemens and Wither (2014) confront the same issue in a different way. They focus
on the 2007–2009 federal increases, comparing changes in employment for those
whose wages were swept up by the federal increases (because of lower state minimum
wages) to changes for workers who earned wages that were low but above the levels to
which the federal minimum wage increased. This approach helps circumvent the issue
of spurious correlations between employment changes and minimum wage changes
across states, by using within-state variation in effects of minimum wage changes, al-
though there is a challenge in estimating the effects of minimum wages (or other pol-
icies) during the tumultuous Great Recession period. They find an employment
elasticity for directly affected workers of about −2/3, which is likely larger (negative)
compared to other studies because it is calculated for a more directly targeted group of
workers (discussed more below). Nonetheless, this elasticity may be more relevant to
policy, because it measures employment effects among those most directly affecte-
d—and hence most directly helped, potentially—by a minimum wage increase. When
they apply these methods to teenagers or restaurant workers, the estimate is smaller in
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fected by the minimum wage.
Thompson (2009) uses an alternative approach that also sidesteps the problem of the
choice of control states, comparing areas (rather than workers) within states, which
permits him (like Clemens and Wither) to control for shocks to state economies in an
unrestricted way. Using the variation in state minimum wages generated by the federal
increases in 1996 and 1997, he shows that the state-level analyses that characterize
nearly all US minimum wage studies mask adverse effects in counties where wages are
lower and workers are lower skilled, and hence minimum wages are more binding. For
example, for counties in the bottom third of the teen earnings distribution within a
state, a 10 % federal increase in a year reduced the teen employment share around 3 %,
while at the state level, the estimated effects are small and not statistically significant.39
Thompson’s results do not change the answer to the question of how a higher state
minimum wage affects teen or low-skill employment at the state level. However, they
do imply that minimum wages have adverse effects exactly where they are intended to
do the most good—where skills and wages are low. Moreover, Thompson’s results raise
doubts about appealing to small estimates of minimum wage effects on employment
from state-level studies to argue that city-level minimum wages will not cause job
loss—especially for cities or sections of cities where minimum wages would affect
many workers.
Finally, Liu et al. (Impact of the minimum wage on youth labor markets, forthcom-
ing) address the spatial heterogeneity issue by controlling for common shocks to eco-
nomically-integrated areas. They estimate a standard fixed effects model at the county
level but including interactions between dummy variables for each quarter and Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) “Economic Areas.” Because of how they are defined, these
areas should experience common economic shocks, and since some of them cross state
lines, minimum wage effects can be identified from state variation within these areas
(see, e.g., Johnson and Kort, 2004). The idea, in the context of the recent literature, is
that the BEA designations explicitly identify cross-border areas that are good controls
for each other. Liu et al. find strong evidence of disemployment effects for the youngest
group covered in their data (14–18-year-olds), which are diminished only slightly—to
an elasticity of −0.17—when the Economic Area-by-quarter interactions are included.
Finally, a different approach taken in recent research focuses on the dynamic effects
of minimum wages—how they might affect job growth and hence employment over the
longer term, even if the immediate effects are small. One way to motivate a more
slowly evolving, longer-term effect via job growth is that when new firms are created,
they can choose their technology to minimize costs given the prices of current inputs,
including low-skilled labor. But the technology is then relatively fixed, with limited pos-
sibility for adjustment if, say, the minimum wage increases. Over time, though, firms
created after a minimum wage increase will use technologies that economize more on
low-skilled labor, so that employment responds little right away to a minimum wage in-
crease, but over time more low-skilled jobs are eliminated. Meer and West (Effects of
the minimum wage on employment dynamics, forthcoming) find evidence consistent
with this story, finding a longer-run elasticity for overall employment of about −0.07.
This paper is unique, I believe, in reporting negative effects for overall employment,
and such a conclusion merits further scrutiny. However, the authors do present some
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skilled workers, although there are some exceptions.
This recent evidence is summarized in Table 4. The table emphasizes a couple of key
points. First, many studies—including many recent studies—find that higher minimum
wages reduce employment of teens and low-skilled workers more generally. The excep-
tions in recent work that find no evidence of employment effects generally come from
one specific way of estimating the employment effects of minimum wages—focusing on
geographically-proximate controls—that has been subject to some criticism and may
well obscure the disemployment effects of minimum wages. Moreover, a variety of
other methods in the most recent research find disemployment effects—including
many that take different approaches to the potential problem of spatial heterogeneity
that can bias state-level estimates. Thus, although the evidence on the employment ef-
fects of minimum wages remains contested, this overview shows that many types of
studies continue to show disemployment effects of minimum wages, and helps clarify
what types of studies do and do not lead to this conclusion. In addition, it demonstrates
that blanket statements such as “There’s just no evidence that raising the minimum
wage costs jobs, at least when the starting point is as low as it is in modern America”
(Krugman, 2015) are untrue and can only be supported by a sharply selective reading
of the evidence.
3.2.2 Income effects
Despite employment costs, a higher minimum wage could help poor and low-income
families, on net, if it delivers more in the way of wage gains than job losses to such
families. Let us first consider the potential impact of minimum wages on workers’
earnings and then turn to family incomes.
It is often asserted that because estimated employment elasticities in the range −0.1
to −0.2 are well below 1 in absolute value, the earnings of affected workers, on the
whole, will rise substantially when the minimum wage is raised (for example, Freeman,
1996). However, this type of estimated elasticity is not the correct one to use in asking
whether workers’ earnings rise when the minimum wage goes up, for two reasons. First,
the estimated elasticity from the usual minimum wage study typically understates the
elasticity of demand for affected workers because not all workers included in the study
are affected. To see this in the context of a study of teenagers, for example, we can
write the minimum wage elasticity for all teenagers as a weighted average of the elasti-
city for workers directly affected by a change in the minimum wage and the elasticity
for workers currently earning above the minimum wage, or
e ¼ eA⋅pA þ eNA⋅ 1−pA ;
where e is the estimated elasticity for teenagers as a whole, eA and eNA are the mini-mum wage elasticities for affected and unaffected workers, and pA is the proportion
directly affected by the change in the minimum wage. If we assume that the elasticity
for unaffected workers is zero, then the minimum wage elasticity for affected workers
(eA) can be written eA = e/pA. It follows that the minimum wage elasticity for affected
teenage workers is greater than the elasticity estimated for teenagers as a whole, which
is also true if eNA is nonzero but smaller than eA.
Table 4 Key early, recent, and summary estimates of minimum wage effects on unskilled employment
Authors Employment elasticity and groups studied Data/approach
Early estimates/summary
Brown et al. (1982) −0.1 to −0.3, mostly for teenagers, −0.1 to −0.2 for 16–24-year-olds Aggregate time series
Recent summaries/meta-analyses
Neumark and Wascher (2007) Many estimates in the range of −0.1 to −0.2 for teens and other low-skilled groups; sometimes larger
negative when focusing more specifically on least-skilled groups
Narrative survey of many papers
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) Average across studies of −0.19 for teens and low-skilled; 0.04 using their correction for publication bias Meta-analysis, average across many studies
Belman and Wolfson (2014) Range of estimates from averaging across studies for teens and low-skilled, −0.03 to −0.10; when weighted
inversely by precision, −0.03 to −0.10; with corrections for publication bias, −0.02 to −0.06
Meta-analysis, average across many studies
Recent estimates
Geographically-proximate changes
Dube et al. (2010) Near zero for teens and restaurant workers Paired counties on opposite sides of state borders
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) Near zero for teens States compared only to those in same Census division
Gittings and Schmutte: Getting
handcuffs on an octopus:
minimum wages, employment,
and turnover, Unpublished
Near zero for teens; larger negative elasticities in markets with short non-employment durations
(−0.1 to −0.98) and smaller positive elasticities in markets with long non-employment durations
(0.2 to 0.46)
States compared only to those in same Census division
Addison et al. (2013) Varying sign, more negative, generally insignificant for restaurant workers and teens; stronger
negative at the height of Great Recession (−0.34)
Similar methods to Dube et al. (2010) and Allegretto et al.
(2011), restricted to the 2005–2010 period
Other approaches
Neumark et al. (2014a, 2014b) −0.14/−0.15 for teens, −0.05/−0.06 for restaurant workers States compared to data-driven choice of controls (synthetic
control), and state panel data
Totty (2014) Most near zero, some near −0.04 for restaurant workers; 0 to −0.15 for teens States compared to data-driven choice of controls (factor model)
Powell: Synthetic control
estimation beyond case studies:
does the minimum wage
decrease teen employment?,
Unpublished
−0.10 States compared to data-driven choice of controls (synthetic













Table 4 Key early, recent, and summary estimates of minimum wage effects on unskilled employment (Continued)
Baskaya and Rubinstein: Using
federal minimum wage effects to
identify the impact of minimum
wages on employment and
earnings across U.S. states,
unpublished
−0.5 for teens States, using federally induced variation as instrumental variable
Clemens and Wither (2014) Appx. −0.67, for those directly affected by minimum wage increase Targeted/affected workers versus other low-wage workers in
states affected by federal increases
Thompson (2009) −0.3 (for teen employment share) Low-wage counties vs. higher-wage counties in states
Liu et al.: Impact of the minimum
wage on youth labor markets,
forthcoming
−0.17 (14–18-year-olds) Comparisons within BEA Economic Areas (EA) that cross state
lines, with controls for EA-specific shocks
Meer and West: Effects of the
minimum wage on employment
dynamics, forthcoming
Long-run elasticity for overall employment of −0.07, in many cases concentrated in low-wage industries State panel data, long differences with lagged effects
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wage—which is what will influence workers’ earnings—will be smaller than the mini-
mum wage increase itself. Letting ΔWA denote the average wage change of those
workers whose wages are directly affected by the change in the minimum wage and
ΔMW the legislated increased, and using the equation above as well, the demand elasti-
city for affected workers can be written as
eA ¼ e=pA ⋅ ΔMW=ΔWA ;
where (ΔMW/ΔWA) > 1. Thus, both factors blow up eA to a larger negative number.
Neumark and Wascher (2008) show, using data from the 1996–1997 minimum wage
increases, that it is not implausible to assume that an overall teen elasticity of e = −0.1
translates into eA = −0.9, or an elasticity e = −0.2 into eA = −1.8, suggesting that the rele-
vant elasticity could well be in the range in which an increase in the minimum wage
leads to a reduction in the average earnings of affected low-wage workers.
Moreover, once we turn to family income, the problem is that the policy targets low-
wage workers, not low-income families, and hence, the benefits are poorly targeted, for
three reasons. First, over half (57 %) of poor families with heads of household aged 18
to 64 have no workers (calculations based on 2014 CPS data). Second, some workers
are poor not because of low wages but because of low hours; for example, in the same
data, 46 % of poor workers have hourly wages above $10.10 and 36 % have hourly
wages above $12 (two recently-proposed federal minimum wage levels). And third, due
in part to the large share of teenagers in the minimum wage workforce, many low-
wage workers are not in poor families (Lundstrom: When is a good time to raise the
minimum wage? Contemporary Economic Policy, forthcoming).
A simple calculation demonstrates the potential problem. Suppose we simply increase
wages to the new mandated level and assume no employment or hours changes. For
the case of the proposed federal increase to $10.10, based on CPS data from 2010 to
2014, 18 % of the total increase in incomes would go to poor families (Lundstrom:
When is a good time to raise the minimum wage? Contemporary Economic Policy,
forthcoming). The distributional effects of course look better at a higher threshold for
“low income”, with 49 % of the benefits going to families that have incomes below twice
the poverty line. However, 32 % would go to families with incomes at least three times
the poverty line, which, for a family of four, is nearly equal to median family income in
the USA. Moreover, the problem is made worse, not better, by going to a higher mini-
mum wage, because the higher-wage workers who are affected by a higher minimum
wage are less likely to be poor. For example, with a $12 minimum wage, only 15 % of
the benefits go to poor families and 35 % go to families with incomes at least three
times the poverty line, and with a $15 minimum wage, the corresponding figures are
12 and 38 %.
There are far fewer causal estimates of how minimum wages affect poverty, com-
pared to studies of employment effects. Moreover, as emphasized by Neumark and
Wascher (2008, p. 190), the answer is likely to depend on the policy environment and
the distribution of income and wages. As an example, research on city-level living
wages—which set higher-wage floors than minimum wages and affect different work-
ers—finds mildly positive distributional effects.
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evidence of net reductions in poverty (Neumark and Wascher, 2008).40 In contrast,
Dube (Minimum wages and the distribution of family incomes, Unpublished) argues
that minimum wages reduce poverty. He reports that methods similar to those in Alle-
gretto et al. (2011)—using geographically-proximate state controls—lead to evidence of
strong poverty reductions from a higher minimum wage,41 and he argues that the range
of estimates in the existing research is consistent with his results. There are a number
of reasons to question his conclusions.
First, he uses the same methods of geographically-proximate controls that drive the
findings of no employment effects. If these methods mask disemployment effects, it
would not be surprising that they also suggest better distributional effects. Regardless,
we see again (although with fewer studies) that conclusions more supportive of using
the minimum wage to increase income from work hinge on a particular identification
strategy. Second, it is difficult to view the evidence from the existing literature as con-
sistent with Dube’s findings. Nearly all of the estimates reviewed in his Table 1 for large
representative samples fail to find statistically significant evidence that minimum wages
reduce poverty, although many are negative.42 Third, other recent work suggests that
Dube’s conclusions are fragile. Sabia (2014) reports that with a longer sample period
(1979–2012 versus 1990–2012), the types of specifications Dube advocates fail to point
to significant effects of minimum wages on poverty (or extreme poverty), although
from a policy perspective we may be interested in what more recent data show. Sabia
also reports that Dube’s specification with spatial controls delivers weaker anti-poverty
results when the sample conditions on workers, whereas we should expect stronger
results—perhaps suggestive of model misspecification—although he does not show that
the specification without spatial controls is free of this problem.
Nonetheless, there are some open questions about the actual effects of minimum
wages on poverty. Most of the point estimates of the effects of minimum wages on pov-
erty are in fact negative, suggesting that it may be more likely than not that the distri-
butional effects are in the direction of reducing poverty; a lack of statistically significant
evidence does not imply that there is no effect. At the same time, one cannot appeal to
a set of studies that fail to find a statistically significant negative effect of minimum
wages on poverty to bolster the claim that minimum wages reduce poverty, while also
appealing (more selectively) to a set of estimates of the effect of minimum wages on
employment that are generally negative but statistically insignificant to argue that the
minimum wage does not reduce employment.
In addition, there is some evidence that the distributional consequences of minimum
wages may be slightly better in recent data. First, Lundstrom (When is a good time to
raise the minimum wage? Contemporary Economic Policy, forthcoming) shows that the
target efficiency of the minimum wage increased slightly over the past 10–15 years,
attributable in large part to declines in income among near-poor minimum wage
workers. Although the increase in target efficiency is very small, and a large share of
minimum wage benefits would still go to non-poor and high-income families (as noted
above),; Lundstrom’s work highlights how adverse changes in the distribution of wages
and income can improve the targeting of the minimum wage.
Second, perhaps reflective of this, evidence in Neumark and Wascher (2011) may
suggest that in more recent data the distributional effects of minimum wages are more
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lished) argues. Some specifications in that paper focused only on the estimation of
minimum wage effects, in isolation from the EITC. These estimates, reproduced in the
top row of Table 5, yield an elasticity of the poverty rate with respect to the minimum
wage of −0.29. This particular conclusion could be misleading, however. First, this elas-
ticity is for a narrow age range (21–44) of family heads, chosen because of the paper’s
focus on the EITC. In addition, the dependent variable is whether family
earnings—rather than income as defined in the CPS and used to measure poverty—is
below the poverty line.
To explore these issues, I went back to the data from that paper. I first esti-
mated a simpler specification that is closer to the standard panel data specification
in most of the poverty and minimum wage studies. The estimate is similar—a sta-
tistically significant elasticity of −0.27 (row B); the result is similar including state-
specific linear trends. In row C, however, when I use a poverty indicator as the
dependent variable, the estimate becomes smaller and statistically insignificant, pre-
sumably reflecting changes in other sources of income as labor earnings chan-
ge—in particular, the fact that some transfers decline when the minimum wage
goes up.43 In rows D and E, I drop the upper limit on the age range, to getTable 5 Minimum wages and poverty
With state linear
trends
Description of estimate Parameter Sample Estimate Elasticity Estimate Elasticity
A. Reported by Dube, based on
NW (2011, Table 6a)
Effect on P(earnings
< poverty)
Ages 21–44 −0.055 −0.29 … …
B. Recomputed from NW data
















































































Notes: All estimates are weighted, and standard errors are clustered on states. Linear probability estimates are reported.
The minimum wage (MW) variable is the average of the log of the contemporaneous and lagged minimum wage. In the
log earnings specification, $1 is substituted for zero earnings prior to taking logs. The estimates are robust to including
state-specific linear trends. The sample is restricted to heads of families, primary individuals, or unrelated individuals.
Estimates use same data and similar specification to Neumark and Wascher (2011)
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rate writ large. In this case, none of the estimates is statistically significant and the
elasticities are smaller.
I next turn to estimates of the distributional effects for subgroups that are more dis-
advantaged and where the impact of the minimum wage could differ. I report results
for families with kids, where the head has at most a high-school education, or where
the head is black or Hispanic, families headed by single females with kids, and families
headed by single females with at most a high-school education, or who are black or
Hispanic. There is only a significant effect on reducing poverty in one case—for single
women with kids—but this is not robust to including state-specific linear trends. None-
theless, all of the estimates in Table 5 are negative.
These findings should not be viewed as decisive, but suggestive.44 It is perhaps
surprising that few empirical analyses have zoomed in on these kinds of subgroups.
DeFina (2008) studied female-headed households with kids and found negative and
significant poverty reduction effects, and Sabia (2008, 2014) found negative but not
significant poverty reduction effects for this group. A natural question is whether
poverty goes up for other groups when the minimum wage increases, which could
help explain why aggregate effects of minimum wages on poverty are close to zero,
with minimum wages helping to reduce poverty among some subgroups with
which we might be particularly concerned, even if there is no evidence of an over-
all beneficial effect.
This kind of conclusion is echoed in more recent evidence on distributional effects of
minimum wages finding that a more generous EITC can improve the distribu-
tional effects of a higher minimum wage (Neumark and Wascher, 2011), viewed
alongside the increased generosity of state EITCs in the 2000s. The basic mechan-
ism the study conjectures is as follows. First, assume that there is heterogeneity
in reservation wages among individuals who would earn wages near the minimum
if they worked. In that case, either a minimum wage or an EITC can induce some
individuals to enter the labor market, perhaps (especially in the case of the mini-
mum wage) displacing others of lower productivity.45 However, there may be
other individuals with higher reservation wages who enter the labor market only
when there is both a high minimum wage and a more generous EITC. If these in-
dividuals are the ones to whom we would like to try to redistribute income—for
example, if single mothers with children have particularly high reservation wages
among roughly comparably skilled workers—then combining the EITC with a
higher minimum wage may enhance the beneficial distributional effects of the
EITC (and vice versa).
The results in Neumark and Wascher (2011) indicate that a combination of a
higher state minimum wage and a more generous state EITC leads to higher em-
ployment and positive distributional effects for single women with children. To be
clear, this research does not change the conclusion that minimum wages destroy
jobs, and indeed the same combination of policies leads to more adverse employ-
ment effects than either policy in isolation for specific groups—like teenagers and
less-skilled minority men—that are not eligible for the EITC, who are hit by both
the higher minimum wage and increased employment by EITC recipients. But the
distributional effects may still be viewed as favorable.
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Overall, the evidence indicates that policymakers are not powerless to boost employ-
ment or increase income from work—in either the context of countercyclical efforts
following a severe downturn or the longer term. Specific types of hiring credits that
states adopted in the Great Recession period—in particular, credits targeting the un-
employed, and with recapture provisions—succeeded in boosting employment, al-
though many other types of credits did not spur job growth. In addition, “deep”
hiring credits in the form of generous wage subsidies often amounting to 100 %
were effective at motivating employers to hire disadvantaged workers after the
Great Recession, with some persistence of higher employment and earnings beyond
the subsidy period. Perhaps consistent with earlier research suggesting that nar-
rowly targeted hiring credits are ineffective, these wage subsidies did not focus on
the severely disadvantaged, and some subsidies targeted the long-term unemployed.
This evidence on hiring credits suggests that we might consider enacting legislation
that triggers hiring credits when recessions hit, as we do with UI extensions and
other automatic stabilizers.
There is ample evidence that the EITC encourages increased employment,46 although
it is likely not effective solely as a job creation strategy, especially during a recession
and recovery. More generally, the EITC is effective at providing higher income than
low-skilled workers earn on their own and does a good job of targeting poor and low-
income families with children, although it also lowers wages for some workers who are
not eligible for the EITC.
The minimum wage has received the most attention of late in efforts to counter ris-
ing inequality, with many state minimum wage increases and a number of US cities
implementing or considering minimum wages as high as $15 an hour. The claim that
minimum wages can be increased to more moderate levels or to levels like these
without entailing job loss is not supported by most of the research evidence. However,
that only establishes that there is a trade-off with potential gains from a higher mini-
mum. Existing research does not make a strong case that a higher minimum wage
would reduce poverty or help low-income families generally. But many estimates—even
if not statistically significant—are in this direction, and some new evidence presented
in this paper suggests that families with kids headed by low-skill women may particu-
larly benefit, as they also do from a combination of a higher EITC and minimum wage.
Regardless, I have particularly serious concerns about the potential labor market con-
sequences for low-skilled workers of much higher minimum wages. A $15 per hour
minimum wage corresponds to full-time, annual earnings of around $30,000, and it
seems to me that regardless of one’s view of the overall evidence on minimum wages
and employment, we cannot dismiss the potential adverse consequences of such high
wage floors for very low-skilled workers—a group that includes a disproportionate
share of minorities.
Finally, it is important to focus not just on the short-term but on the longer-
term effects of these policies. Some recent research on minimum wages suggests
that the employment costs grow over time. And the implications of the alternative
policies for longer-term earnings growth at the individual level, via effects on hu-
man capital accumulation, have barely been explored. It seems plausible that pol-
icies that assist rather than interfering with young, unskilled workers gaining a
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workers become economically self-sufficient. This would argue for relying mostly on the
EITC to increase incomes from work and using well-designed wage subsidies or hiring
credits (as well as the EITC) to help workers obtain or regain job market opportunities.
Endnotes
1For useful statistics on the depth of the Great Recession and the speed of recovery,
in comparison to past recessions, see http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_pa-
pers/studies/recession_perspective/, viewed January 19, 2014.
2The paper does not cover employment and training programs, such as the Work-
force Investment Act (WIA), in part because some parameters had to be drawn around
the policies considered and also because such policies fall more under indirect attempts
to improve employment and earnings through increases in human capital, rather than
direct policies to incentivize job creation or raise incomes. For a recent review of evidence
on these programs and somewhat positive evaluation of the WIA, see Heinrich et al. (2013).
3See, e.g., http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm, viewed May 15, 2014.
4Despite being non-categorical, the NJTC created stronger incentives to hire low-
wage workers by applying only to the first $4200 of wages per employee.
5There is virtually no empirical work on state hiring credits. A recent, preliminary
paper (Chirinko and Wilson, 2010) estimates the effects of state hiring credits, finding
some modest evidence of positive effects. The Neumark and Grijalva paper differs in
numerous ways, including its focus on the effects of hiring credits enacted during and
after the Great Recession and using a much more comprehensive database on state hir-
ing credit programs that captures far more credits (nearly 150 from 1969 to 2012).
Bartik and Erickcek (2010) evaluated the MEGA Tax Credit Program in Michigan,
which is quite different from other hiring credits in using discretionary grants. Their
evaluation is quite different from the research described below, using simulations from
a regional economic model. And there are some evaluations of small-scale more-
targeted hiring credit (or “voucher”) experiments (e.g., Burtless, 1985).
6One exception is that Kansas’s Enterprise Zone Job Creation Tax Credit is included
in the database, because the incentives apply statewide.
7Data on jobs and the counterfactual business cycle measure come from the
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).
8The HIRE Act was enacted in 2010. However, it is hard to estimate its effects. State
hiring credits provide credits against state taxes, whereas the HIRE Act provided
credits against federal taxes, so that the change in hiring incentives from the HIRE Act
is essentially the same in all states regardless of their own credits.
9As discussed in Neumark and Grijalva, state reports indicate that these recapture
provisions are actually used by states to recover credits when job creation (or other)
goals are not met. For example, a list of websites providing information on penalties for
noncompliance is available in Appendix 5 of Good Jobs First (2012).
10Note that the effect of ARRA spending is positive (although not significant) at long
lags. This is consistent with Wilson’s (2012) finding that long first-difference estimates of
the effects of ARRA spending on job growth were positive, although he estimates a much
different specification—including some IV estimates—and finds large positive effects that
exceed substantially other estimates of job creation by the ARRA (see Neumark, 2013).
Neumark IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:6 Page 32 of 3811In principle, anticipated hiring credits (between enactment and implementation)
can reduce hiring before the credit takes place, so that firms can capture the credit after
it is implemented. In this case, a short-term analysis finding an employment increase in
the period when a credit was enacted could reflect shifting of employment from the
previous period to the current period, without any implication that on net more jobs
were created. However, Table 1 reports cumulative effects out to 12 months, which
grow over time for the two kinds of credits I emphasize as having positive
effects—credits with recapture provisions and credits targeting the unemployed. While
it is possible that some structure of adjustment costs could in principle imply that all
of this response—including the growth in the effect—is the optimal adjustment to a
lowering of employment prior to the credit being adopted, this seems fairly unlikely, al-
though it cannot be decisively ruled out. As additional suggestive evidence that we are
seeing a real effect, Neumark and Grijalva (2013) show that there is no relationship be-
tween lagged employment growth and the enactment of credits. That analysis was
intended to rule out credits being adopted in response to prior changes in employment
growth, but the empirical implications of employment being initially cut in response to
credits due to take effect in the future would be the same.
12Neumark and Grijalva (2013) report on numerous additional analyses—includ-
ing the addition of state-specific linear trends—that establish that these findings
are quite robust and likely not reflective of endogenous adoption of hiring credits.
Nonetheless, research designs that avoid this problem can be useful. As a recent
example, Boockmann et al. (2012) estimate the effect of a hiring subsidy in
Germany, targeted on older workers, on exits from unemployment. They use nar-
row age differences for eligibility to identify the effect of the subsidy.
13Cahuc et al. (2014) find that the enactment of a national hiring credit in France at
the onset of the Great Recession, which targeted low-wage workers at small firms in
the context of a high minimum wage, had a substantial effect on employment without
inducing much churning (although it still entailed large windfalls).
14States could be reimbursed for increased welfare-related spending in one of three
areas, up to 80 % of a cap for each state; one of the areas of spending was subsidized
jobs. Lower-Basch (2011) reports that spending on wage subsidy programs under the
TANF Emergency Fund totaled $1.32 billion. There was some additional funding (an
extra $1 billion under ARRA) via Community Services Block Grants that could be used
for these programs, with relaxed criteria for the eligible population (up to 200 % of the
poverty line from 100 or 125 %).
15Survey evidence indicates that employers were more likely to report the reason for
participation as trying out an employee before fully committing, in two sites where
subsidized workers were on the payroll of a third party, compared to two other sites
covered (48 and 56% versus 36 and 40 %); see Roder and Elliott (2013).
16Indeed, my view is that the main point Lower-Basch makes in her generally
positive evaluation of the job subsidy programs under the TANF Emergency Fund
is demonstrating that such programs could be brought to a large scale quickly, ra-
ther than that there is decisive evidence of strong job creation effects. Job creation
should also imply reduced UI expenses. The only evidence I have found is a dis-
cussion of the Texas Back to Work program in Warland et al. (n.d.), noting that
the Texas Workforce Commission reported high (63 %) continuation rates of
Neumark IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:6 Page 33 of 38employment after subsidies ended and net savings from reduced UI compared to
those eligible for the credit who were not placed. However, the authors are cau-
tionary about the validity of this comparison, because of potential differences be-
tween those who were and were not placed.
17They also report consistent evidence from an employer survey, in which 76 %
indicated that they retained at least one subsidized worker after the subsidy period
ended, and overall that 37 % of workers were retained.
18Florida (and one other site Roder and Elliott cover) did not provide pre-placement
services, although participants could already access services available at One-Stop
Career Centers.
19Such incentives were used in the Washington State Community Jobs Program
(Warland et al., n.d.). I have not found other discussion of use of such incentives in the
many programs set up under the TANF Emergency Fund.
20See, e.g., http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/31/business/la-fi-obama-jobs-20140201,
viewed May 15, 2014.
21See https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2821, viewed January
19, 2016
22Most EITC recipients chose to take their payment as a lump sum at the end of the
year rather than in each paycheck. (The latter was an option that ended after 2010.)
This choice to take the lump sum may have been in part to avoid stigma effects.
23For recent evidence on this characterization of the Great Recession, see Rothstein
(2014). For a different interpretation, see Mulligan (2012).
24See http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report.pdf, viewed May
16, 2014.
25State EITCs were implemented in additional states subsequently.
26For similar evidence for the UK, see Leigh (2007), and for related US evidence, see
Neumark and Wascher (2001).
27Bitler et al. (2014) study how income support policies operate during recessions, in
contrast to this paper’s focus on policies to increase jobs and income from work in the
aftermath of the Great Recession. They show that the EITC does not always smooth
negative income shocks during recessions. It does this for married couples—for whom
reductions in combined incomes move them to lower incomes along the phaseout
range of the EITC, or make them eligible—but not for single parents—for whom job
loss ends eligibility or lower earnings on the phase-in range imply smaller payments. This
echoes a more general limitation of the EITC or other in-work policies—that it provides
nothing for those who cannot work or cannot find work. Thus, the EITC is not a complete
substitute for other forms of income support for those with no or very low earnings.
28A very interesting evaluation of an experimental EITC program in New York
City—Paycheck Plus—is currently underway, with results expected in 2017/2018
(see http://www.mdrc.org/publication/paycheck-plus-making-work-pay-low-income-
single-adults, viewed October 9, 2014).
29This evidence comes from shocks across regions in import competition from
Chinese manufacturing. Clearly, this source of variation is not the same as in-
creasing employment subsidies to childless men; but it does provide plausibly
causal evidence linking higher employment among men to marriage and family
structure.
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Nizalova (2007) suggesting that minimum wages may have long-term adverse effects
on wages and employment, stemming in part from lost work experience. Recent evi-
dence in Dahl et al. (2009) suggests that single women induced to enter the labor mar-
ket because of the EITC had higher subsequent earnings growth, possibly via increased
human capital accumulation stemming from the positive employment effects of the
EITC, although this study is based on considerably earlier data only from federal ex-
pansions of the EITC in the early 1990s.
31Mulheirn and Pisani (Estimating the labor supply effect of the working tax credit
for childless households in the UK, Unpublished) report a positive employment effect
from the introduction of an earned income tax credit for childless adults in the UK.
32See http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/sotu_minimum_wage.pdf,
viewed May 9, 2014.
33See http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/business/help-the-working-poor-but-share-
the-burden.html?src=recg&_r=0, viewed May 19, 2014.
34See, e.g., http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-13/how-mcdonald-s-and-wal-
mart-became-welfare-queens.html, viewed May 19, 2014.
35See also Leigh (2010). Rothstein’s analysis also suggests that a negative income tax
(NIT), because it reduces labor supply via income effects, would deliver larger gains in in-
come per dollar spent. And of course, an NIT offers the important advantage of providing
resources to those who cannot work, for whom we currently provide benefits in many
other ways that may be far more expensive administratively and in some cases imply higher
implicit marginal tax rates than an NIT. This paper, however, focuses on policies that raise
incomes from work. How to supply basic needs to the population including those who do
not work is a different problem with its own set of complications (see Moffitt, 2003).
36The figure in the original Doucouliagos and Stanley paper restricts the range of the
x-axis much more severely. We are not sure where Schmitt’s version of the figure
comes from; we suspect it is from an unpublished version of the paper.
37Gittings and Schmutte (Getting handcuffs on an octopus: minimum wages, employ-
ment, and turnover, Unpublished) report similar results on employment effects, using
approaches similar to those in Allegretto et al. Addison et al. (2013) also use similar
methods to estimate effects for teens and restaurant workers from the three-step fed-
eral minimum wage increase over 2007–2009. They find limited overall evidence
of disemployment effects; the elasticities vary from positive to negative but tend to be
more negative but also statistically insignificant. However, for teens there is stronger evi-
dence of disemployment effects when the recession hit, with an estimated significant elas-
ticity of −0.34 at the average unemployment rate in 2008–2009.
38Neumark et al. (2014b) also discuss another specification issue raised in the Alle-
gretto et al. and Dube et al. studies concerning detrending the data. In my view, how-
ever, the more cogent challenge in the earlier studies comes from the issue of the
choice of control states, which is why I emphasize that issue here.
39This estimate cannot be compared directly to other elasticity estimates, because
there is no population count in the data source used.
40Another issue is who bears the costs. A recent simulation study (MaCurdy, 2015) cal-
culates the price effects of a minimum wage increase and characterizes its effects as akin
to a sales or value-added tax that is even more regressive than a standard sales tax.
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elasticity of the number of poor people with respect to the minimum wage is −0.05
(Congressional Budget Office, 2014; p. 11). Dube’s estimated elasticity of the poverty
rate with respect to the minimum wage in his preferred specifications is −0.24 to −0.36.
42Some of the estimates in Addison and Blackburn (1999) point to significant reduc-
tions in poverty, but these are for very narrow subsets of the population and hence
largely irrelevant to the policy question. One other exception, to which I return below,
is DeFina (2008), who studies female-headed households with children.
43For related evidence on this in the context of a proposed living wage increase, see
Neumark et al. (2013).
44There is also nearly an infinite number of ways to define subgroups, and some (like
using an age range of 16–64) give results that are sometimes statistically significant, al-
though not for both the models with and without state-specific linear trends. Dube
(Minimum wages and the distribution of family incomes, Unpublished) only reports
original results for those under age 65, which as this note indicates is the group for
which there is more evidence (although non-robust) of beneficial distributional effects.
It is not immediately obvious why we would not be interested in those aged 65 and
over, who can be either directly or indirectly (through other workers in their families)
affected by minimum wages.
45The conventional theory does not imply that employment of any particular sub-
group will decrease in response to a higher minimum wage; it only predicts that overall
labor demand for less-skilled workers will fall. In particular, individuals for whom the
market wage was previously below the reservation wage could be drawn into the labor
force after a minimum wage increase.
46The evidence that the EITC increases employment on the extensive margin seems
unambiguous. More generally, evidence cited earlier suggests net positive labor supply
effects in the aggregate, although they are not large.
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